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Discretion and discrimination at street level

Case-worker attitudes and the shaping of employment services when service users have ethnic minority background.

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FIRST DRAFT - Please do not quote

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The goal of this research is to identify factors that account for unequal treatment of non-western immigrants who are users of employment services. The importance of the case-workers' attitudes towards these users are given particular attention. Do immigrants receive poorer services from case-workers who are sceptical towards immigrants and immigration? The analysis is based on a web-survey among 477 case-workers in the employment services in Norway. The dependent variable is whether or not the caseworkers tend to overrule the immigrant users' wishes to participate in the labour market measure "job placement" (arbeidspraksis). We find that case-workers who hold the opinion that refugee immigration policy should become stricter, and case-workers that contend that immigrant users are generally little motivated for work, are more likely to overrule the wishes of unemployed immigrants that wish to participate in job placement than other case-workers. A number of other factors also influence the tendency to overrule, among them case-load and the overall assessment of the case-workers of whether or not on the job placement is an efficient measure for labour market integration of immigrants.

Introduction

Case-work necessarily implies some sort of discretion on the part of the bureaucrat – even though the room for discretion varies greatly between different types of casework. The use of discretion in interactions with clients makes street-level bureaucrats not only important policy implementers, but also important policy makers, as pointed out by Lipsky (1980) and several later contributions. Generally, ambitions to tailor services to individual needs and to involve users in the shaping in services increase the room for discretion (Djuve and Kavli 20007). The user's participation and the bureaucrat's discretionary judgment are mutually interdependent: Appropriate individual adaptation presumes that the user's situation and preferences are taken into account in the best possible way. This is hard to achieve unless the user participates. At the same time, the discretionary judgment exercised by the responsible official will decide to what extent the user's perspective should influence the design of the service provided, and/or the choice of measures applied. It is the latter type of user influence that is studied here: To what extent will case-workers let users decide on

whether or not the measure “job placement” is to be used – and to what extent do the personal norms of the case-worker influence the decision?

The tailoring of social services represents a widespread but relatively new trend. Historically, the development of the welfare state’s social policies has involved a trend away from the discretionary benefits previously provided by the poor relief funds towards more rights-based, and thereby more dignified, benefits (Hatland and Lerum 2005). The modern welfare state was built according to the classical model of administration: rules are given by elected organs, and the task of the bureaucrat is to identify a relevant rule in order to achieve the objectives embedded in the rules (Weber 1920/1978). Less discretionary judgment and more rule-based rights were intended to ensure a greater degree of equal treatment.

During the 1990s, the rights-based and rule-based models faced increasing criticism, both in Norway as well as in other European countries. Criticism of the rule-based regime came from several quarters, but was chiefly based in the acknowledgement that no two cases are identical. This leads to different cases being subsumed under the same rule, which will lead to inequality of outcome. The measures may therefore become inefficient, and at worst turn out to be counterproductive. The latter is associated with the fact that standardised and rights-based schemes in certain cases may entail a dependency on welfare-state policies, instead of providing the resources required for people to take control of their own lives. These problems are particularly pronounced when the population is characterised by heterogeneity in family structures and values (Eriksen 2001; Kavli 2003).

In other words, the standardised solutions faced criticism for being too little on the mark, and arguments were advanced in support of more individualised solutions (tailoring), based on more extensive consideration for, and contacts with, the individual user (Hatland and Lærum 2005). This stronger focus on designing the benefit in cooperation between the user and the bureaucrat at the same time involves an element of decentralisation and use of discretionary judgment. The more influence that is exerted by the user, the more decisions necessarily must be taken locally. The welfare state’s front line – represented by the front-

line services and its users – is thereby turned into an important arena. This is where the tailors of the welfare state must convert political intentions into practice.

Discretionary judgment: Theory and hypotheses

Personal norms and attitudes

Discretionary judgment based on personal norms is of particular interest for several reasons. *First*, this type of discretion has a high likelihood of leading to unequal treatment of similar cases. The purpose of tailoring and use of discretionary judgment was precisely to solve the problems caused by the fact that formal equality of treatment may result in unequal outcomes, but when the exercise of this discretion must be based to some extent on personal norms, one runs the risk that even highly similar cases are treated differently. If so, this represents a problem for the guaranteed equality before the law. *Second*, the lack of insight into the consequences of this exercise of discretion represents a potential problem for democracy: the bureaucrats exert an influence on practical policy that is not embedded in democratic processes. Lipsky (1980) points out that “street-level bureaucrats” engage in policy design in two different ways: through the substantial consequences resulting from their discretionary judgment with regard to the individuals with whom they interact, and through the sum total of these actions, which represent the interpretation and implementation of the regulations by the social services. *Third*, a deficient professional and political basis for decisions may constitute a burden on the officials and may eventually lead to burn-out: exercising discretionary judgment on the basis of personal norms is not necessarily comfortable.

On the other hand, the asymmetry of power in the relation between the bureaucrat and the citizen provides ample space for disregarding the citizens’ perspectives.

Employing the concept of 'user' for the citizen's meeting with the public social services is debatable. Lipsky uses the term 'client', and points out that the role of client as a rule is involuntary: it is impossible for those who have no other sources of income to opt out of social benefits, and unless one has substantial financial resources, one has no choice other than to use public health services. According to Lipsky this leads to a situation of powerlessness for clients: "If street-level bureaucrats have non-voluntary clients then they cannot be disciplined by those clients. Street-level bureaucracies usually have nothing to lose by failing to satisfy clients." (Lipsky 1980:55). Users of employment services may be so more or less involuntary. The ones that themselves identify job placement as a relevant measure can be expected to be in the more involuntary than users who are unemployed and need assistance to change jobs,: they are unemployed, low-skilled and there are no alternative providers of job placements than the public employment services, but less involuntary than users who are reluctant participants in job placements.

Rules and regulations, management, professional knowledge and experience as well as professional ethics are well established as guiding the discretionary decisions of case-workers. March and Olsen (1989) argue that the classification of problems and choice of solution tend to follow directions and duties that are more or less explicitly embedded in institutional and professional identities. Olsen (2007) refer to this as 'logic of appropriateness', that actions are guided by a perception of what "somebody like me" should do in a given situation. According to Olsen, new-institutionalism distinguishes itself from traditional rational actor theory by its underscoring of roles, normative and causal views as well as resources (and not in beliefs in microrational utility optimizers.) The importance of norms for bureaucratic practice has been stressed by a number of scholars. Heinesen et.al (2004) argue that not only lack of time and resources, but also the bureaucrats' values and attitudes are important to explain how they approach different types of clients and what measures they are most inclined to use. In other words, personal attitudes both concerning *measures* and

groups of clients may affect practice. A similar argument is brought forward by Eriksen (2001) who argue that to some extent the officials may rely on professional ethics, but in many cases they will have to draw on their personal set of norms in order to reach a decision. Our ambition is to illustrate that not only professional and institutional norms, but also individual norms and attitudes towards user groups have an impact on discretionary decisions. *Our hypothesis a) is that case-workers who are skeptical to further immigration, and b) who perceive of users with ethnic minority background as less motivated for work, are more inclined to overrule ethnic minority users who initiate on-the-work-training.* Attitudes towards the measure itself may also play a role. C) *We expect case-workers who do not view job- placements to be an efficient measure to be more inclined to overrule a wish to participate in such training.*

Role definitions and caseload

The requirements faced by the bureaucrat are numerous, and partly contradictory. Several researchers have demonstrated that the distribution of scarce resources – which is generally an important requirement for street-level bureaucrats – may conflict with the requirement to fulfil the needs of clients. Bureaucrats may differ in their priorities between these requirements. Mascini (2008) sums up several categorizations of employees employed by different researchers: hard-liners vs soft liners, gatekeepers vs advocates (or facilitators), bureaucrats vs professionals, and doves vs hawks. We might also add our own “carers” vs “clerks” (Djuve, Kavli and Hagelund 2011). We have tried to capture the “rule-oriented”/clerk type of bureaucrat through a question about whether or not the length of the period of unemployment is given much weight when deciding which service-users are to participate in qualification courses: those who place much importance on the length of unemployment are termed “rule-oriented” (priority to long-term clients is an established principle for allocation of services in the Norwegian employment-services). On the other hand, those who give much importance to the need for the unemployed to participate in courses that give access to some kind of income support are

termed “care-oriented”. Another indicator is to consider those who include “equal outcomes” as part of the definition of the overarching goal of “equality of service provision” as care-oriented. *Our hypothesis d) is that the clerks are more inclined to overrule, while e) the carers are less inclined to overrule.*

Exempt from the bureaucrat vs professional typology, these typologies are in principle a separate dimension from experience and skills, but may of course correlate. Educational level and seniority are included as control variables in the analysis.

The relationship between individual case-worker role definition and policy goal attainment – for example in the form of transition to work – is an empirical question. Some studies indicate that the hard-liners/gatekeepers/clerks are more efficient than the soft-liners/advocates/carers: Behnke et al 2007 finds that caseworkers who place less emphasis on a cooperative and harmonic relationship with their clients increase their employment chances in the short and medium term. Heinesen et al 2004 find that case-workers that maintain “professional distance” towards their clients are more successful in terms of transition to work – but this holds only for municipalities with a relatively difficult task of integration, that is a large number of refugees and a large proportion of refugees from countries with low labour market participation rates. In municipalities with a less difficult task of integration more flexible case-workers seem to be the most successful. These findings may of course reflect that the “hard-liners” focus their efforts on clients that are relatively easy to employ, and less on the less employable. It may however also reflect that a harmonic relationship with the client is not always the most important factor in service provision.

Our dataset does not allow for specification of the local level of difficulty of integration. We do however have data on the caseload of the individual caseworkers, and whether or not the case-worker has routines for follow-up of participants in job placements. Case-workers who follow such routines will probably spend more time with each user, and may be more inclined

to overrule wishes for participation. *Hypthesis e) is that the tendency to overrule wishes to participate in job placements is higher when the caseload is extensive.*

Job-placement and employment services in Norway

The Norwegian employment services (NAV) is organized and financed by the state, but localized in each of the 430 municipalities. Consequently, many of the NAV-offices have a low number of employees. The service targets all unemployed, regardless of ethnic background, and also serves employed people who wish to change job.

Job placement is one of the most common measures applied, along with qualification courses. Participants in job placements and qualification courses are entitled to a so called “individual financial support”. The rates are however quite low, and in most cases considerably lower than social security benefits and unemployment benefits. Many of the participants in job placements and qualification courses qualify for (and receive) social security benefits or unemployment benefits. The amount of these benefits will vary according to needs (social security) and former wages (unemployment benefits). These participants are not entitled to additional individual financial support.

In this context it is important to underscore that job placement is an inexpensive measure relative to qualification courses and wage subsidies.

Job placements do not involve regular employment, but should entail some sort of training. The placements may last from three weeks to up to a year, sometimes even longer. The job placements can be found through the network of the caseworker or the employment services, but the users can also contact employers themselves, and if they are accepted by the employer seek to convince the caseworker to formalize and finance the job training. The intended outcome of the measure is to strengthen the job opportunities of the participants. Analyses of register data do however suggest that the effect of job placement on transition to work is close to zero (Kvinge and Djuve 2007, Hardoy and Zhang 2010). The case-workers themselves


also seem to have rather moderate expectations when it comes to the effect on transition to work. They do however deem the measure to be to the purpose when it comes to improving language skills and knowledge about the Norwegian labour market (Djuve and Tronstad 2011). Unfortunately, clients who have participated in several job placements that do not result in work tend to experience the measure as demeaning (Djuve 2007). All in all, it is questionable whether or not job placement can be considered a scarce good: It is neither very scarce, nor very good.

Norway and modern immigration

Norway has a short track record as an immigration country. In 1950, 1.4 percent of the population were born abroadⁱ. Immigration has since increased and gradually also changed composition. Today, there are immigrants living in all of Norway's 430 municipalities and the immigrant populationⁱⁱ compose approximately 8,3 percent of the country's 4.64 million inhabitants.

The first (modern) immigrants to Norway came from Eastern Europe after the Second World War, followed by labour immigrants from Europe and later on from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco. Since Norway introduced a ban on labour immigration in 1975, the number of refugees from non-western countries has increased and today, three out of four immigrants in Norway have a non-western backgroundⁱⁱⁱ. Figure 1 illustrates both the growth and the changed regional composition of Norway's immigrant population between 1970 and 2006.

Figure 1. Immigrant population in Norway, by region of origin. January 1970 – January 2006.
Source: Population statistics: Statistics Norway.



Today, approximately 1/3 of the immigrants arrive as refugees, 1/3 through family reunification and 1/3 as labour migrants or for educational purposes (Tronstad.al 2006). Virtually every county in the world is represented in Norway's immigrant population, but only 15 with more than 10.000 persons. Persons with Pakistani immigrant background is the largest group with 27 700 persons, followed by Swedes (23 500), Iraqis (20 000) and Danes (19 100)^{iv}. Among the non-western immigrants, other large groups are from Vietnam (18.300), Somalia (18.000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (14.800) and Iran (14.300). After the EU enlargement in 2004, there has also been a steady inflow of labour migrants from Polen. However – it is only refugees and family reunited with refugees who are entitled to the two-year public introductory scheme.

Data and analysis.

The dataset applied here consist of 477 interviews with case-workers in employment services all over Norway. The data are collected through a web-survey that was conducted during fall 2010. We obtained a list of e-mail addresses for employees in

NAV, an organisation that consist of both employment services and several other services. Our list of e-mail addresses therefore did not exclusively contain employees in the employment services. We sent all together 4050 invitations to participate in the survey, and applied a screening question of whether or not the employee worked with job-placements:

Total number of invitations:	4050	
Non-active e-mail addresses	91	
Do not work with job-placement or qualification of job-applicants:	1354	
Net sample	2607	(100%)
Interviews completed	1044	(40%)
Non-response	993	(38%)
Denials		569
(22%)		

The response rate calculated from the net sample was 40%. There is also reason to believe that a substantial amount of the non-response is made up by employees who are not in the target group, and that the “real” response rate is somewhat higher than 40%. The response rates are rather evenly distributed over geographical areas and case-workers age and education (Djuve and Tronstad 2011).

A 40% response-rate is not ideal, but not catastrophically low, particularly when the sample seems to be rather unbiased (judged by the variables available to us). Low response rates make estimations of proportions less reliable. They do however not necessarily affect the analysis of *characteristics* of those who mean this vs those who mean that.

The data are collected for a project financed by The welfare and labour services (NAV), concerning the use of and experiences with job training. The sub-sample analyzed here consist of 477 case-workers who have had at least one user with ethnic minority background participating in job placements within the past six months.

Design

Our dataset is not primarily designed to study the impact of case-workers attitudes on the shaping of services. Ideally, the best way to study discretion and different treatment of comparable cases would be to ask different officials to decide on one identical case. Here, we ask different officials about their decisions in different cases. The validity of our analysis therefore hinges upon the condition that there is no systematic connection between caseworker attitudes and the characteristics of the users that may affect the decision of whether or not to overrule. We can not disregard the possibility of such correlations, but do not find them likely.

177 (37 %) of the 477 of the caseworkers respond that they at least one time over the past six months have denied to finance a job training placement suggested by an ethnic minority user. This is our dependent variable. 25 percent say that mismatch between the job placement and the competences or job ambitions of the user was a reason for overruling the wishes of the user, 39 percent answered that bad experiences with the employer in question was a reason, and 60 percent answered that the job placement in question was unlikely to lead to employment (multiple choice question). We find it unlikely that the objective situation when it comes to mismatches, bad experiences and adequacy of job placements should systematically correlate with case-worker experiences. Attitudes may however correlate with the

caseworkers tendency to judge a job placement to be adequate. This is exactly what we are trying to find out.

We believe that the tendency to overrule the wishes of the service users who themselves have contacted an employer who has agreed to take them in, serve as a good measure of variation in service delivery. If the attitudes of the caseworker correlate with the tendency to overrule, this indicates that these attitudes affect the shaping of services for ethnic minority users.

We have applied bivariate tables and logistic regression in the analysis.

Findings – attitudes towards ethnic minority users

There are several questions in the survey that can be used to map the attitudes of the case-workers towards the users with ethnic minority background. The questions address immigration policy in general, illegitimate use of welfare benefits among immigrants, and assessment of how motivated immigrant users are for work. There is a rather strong connection between caseworkers attitudes toward immigration policy and their tendency to overrule, as well as between their assessment of client job-motivation and the tendency to overrule: Caseworkers who feel that immigration policy should be stricter, and who disagree to the statement that most clients with non-western background are motivated for work, are more inclined to overrule. The question about abuse of the welfare system does not distinguish very well between more or less overruling case-workers. The strongest tendency is that case-workers who answer “don’t know” to this question are less inclined to overrule. The differences between those who agree and those who disagree are relatively small. We have chosen not to include this question in the multivariate analysis. The two other questions are recoded into dichotomous variables: “Lowmotivation” is coded 1 for those who answered that they partially or strongly disagree that immigrants are

motivated for work and 0 for all others, “negative” is coded 1 for those who think that immigration policy should be stricter than today, and 0 for all others.

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworker attitudes to immigrants abuse of the welfare system

Do you agree or disagree to the statement "Most immigrants abuse the social welfare system"?	Percent who has overruled wishes to participate in job placement	N	Std. Deviation
Non response	-	2	,70711
Strongly agree	33,3	6	,51640
Partially agree	45,7	35	,50543
Partially disagree	39,0	213	,48882
Strongly disagree	36,3	146	,48252
Don't know	21,3	75	,41242
Total	35,9	477	,48006

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworker attitudes to immigration policy for refugees

Compared to today; do you think it should be easier for refugees and asylumseekers to obtain residence permit, should it be more difficult, or should the access opportunities be as they are today?	Percent who has overruled wishes to participate in job placement	N	Std. Deviation
Non-response	(57,1)	7	,53452
Lettere	21,4	42	,41530

Som i dag	31,0	261	,46352
Vanskeligere	46,1	167	,49998
Total	35,9	477	,48006

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworker assessment of immigrants' motivation for work

Do you agree or disagree to the statement "Most of my clients with non-western immigrant background are very motivated to find a job"?	Percent who has overruled wishes to participate in job placement	N	Std. Deviation
Non response	-	1	.
Strongly agree	25,4	118	,43729
Partially agree	35,9	270	,48067
Partially disagree	48,0	75	,50296
Strongly disagree	(83,3)	6	,40825
Don't know	(42,9)	7	,53452
Total	35,85	477	,48006

Findings – attitudes towards the measure “Job placement”

As mentioned above, job placement is not a measure that excels in its efficiency when it comes to transition to work. In some cases the measure is abused by employers in order to get access to free labour, and in some cases participants experience the

measure as abusive. In other words, there may be many legitimate reasons for rejecting a particular job placement.

We have constructed an additive index of “negative assessment of the measure job placement”. The index ranges from 0 to maximum 3 points. One point is given for answering that participants often experience job placement as free labour, one point is given to caseworkers who disagree to the statement that job placement is an adequate measure to increase the participants understanding of the Norwegian labour market, and one point is given to caseworkers that disagree to the statement that job placement is an adequate measure to improve the Norwegian proficiency of the participants. There is a clear tendency that the inclination to overrule is higher among caseworkers who scores high on this index.

Another question that may be interpreted as an evaluation of the adequacy of job placement is a question of how important the statement “the user is unmotivated and in need of a push” is, when deciding which users are to participate in job placements. The caseworkers who judge this to be “very important” are significantly more inclined to overrule users who actually want to participate in job placements. In other words, some caseworkers seem to think that job placements are most adequate for reluctant users.

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworkers' score on index for negative assessment of job placement as a measure, see text

Index score	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
0	32,5	342	,46890

1	43,0	114	,49724
2	55,6	18	,51131
3	-	3	,57735
Total	35,6	477	,48006

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworkers' answer to the question: When you allocate the measure job placement, how important is "The user is little motivated and in need of a push"

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Non-response	36,4	22	,49237
Very important	56,3	71	,49950
Quite important	31,8	214	,46670
Not important	31,5	146	,46614
Don't know	37,5	24	,49454
Total	35,9	477	,48006

Role definition: Carers and Clerks

This dataset was not designed to identify the role definition of the caseworkers. Searching the variable list, we have found to candidates that may with some lenience be accepted as indicators of role definition: Caseworkers who agrees to that the users' need for income is an important reason for the use of job placements can be expected to of the more "caring" type, while those who agrees that the length of the unemployment period is an important reason can be expected to be more of a "clerk" or "rule-oriented" type. (Priority to long-term unemployed in the assigning of labour market measures is part of official labour market policy). Here, the "clerk"- indicator seem to distinguish better between caseworkers who are more or less inclined to overrule. As we shall see, the "carer"- indicator has a statistically significant effect on overruling in the multivariate analysis.

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworkers' attitudes towards the importance of the length of the period of unemployment when assigning job placements

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Not important	30,9	330	,46282
Important (clerks?)	46,9	147	,50077
Total	35,9	477	,48006

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworkers' attitudes towards the importance of the users' need for income support

Ikkeinnt	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Important (carers?)	33,9	345	,47410
Not important	40,9	132	,49354
Total	35,9	477	,48006

An alternative set of variables that may be used to distinguish between carers and clerks are the questions concerning the definition of "equality in service provision", that is an overarching goal for all public services. The clerks may tend to answer that "equality in service provision" entails "user participation", which is also an official goal for all public services. The "carers" may go for "equal outcomes", which is a more radical and socially ambitious interpretation of the concept. Again, we find that the clerks are more and the carers less inclined to overrule.

Percent caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement, by caseworkers' understanding of the concept "equal service provision"

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
User participation: NO	,3109	238	,46385
User participation: Yes (clerks?)	,4059	239	,49209
Equal outcome: NO	,3726	424	,48408
Equal outcome YES (carers?)	,2453	53	,43437
Total	,3585	477	,48006

Control variables

In the multivariate analysis we have included the control variables seniority, geographical area (a dummy for the capital), caseload and whether or not the caseworkers have established routines for follow up of participants in job placements. We have also tested out several other control variables – such as the case workers educational level – but in the final analysis we have excluded variables that were very far from statistically significant.

Results from logistic regression

We find that caseworkers attitudes matters: caseworkers who are negative to further immigration and who judge clients with ethnic minority background to be less

motivated for work, are more inclined to overrule the wishes of clients with ethnic minority background. Attitudes towards the measure itself also matters: Not surprisingly, caseworkers who have a negative impression of the effects of job placements are more inclined to reject users suggestions to participate in this measure. We do however find that caseworkers who think that job placement is an adequate measure for users with a motivation problem are also more inclined to overrule the users' wishes when they actually want to participate. We have suggested to interpret this as a tendency that some caseworkers find job placement to be most adequate for reluctant participants.

We also find strong indicators that role definition matters. The bivariate findings that clerks are more inclined to overrule than carers, still hold in the multivariate analysis.

Finally, we find strong effects from the control variables caseload and the dummy for Oslo. The latter finding is probably related to characteristics of the labour market in Oslo, with a high number of ethnic minority and low skilled employed, making competition for adequate job placements tough.

Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	534,198(a)	,169	,232

a Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Dependent variable: caseworkers who during the past six months has overruled a client with ethnic minority background who wishes to participate in job placement

	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Refugee immigration policy should be stricter	,442	,050	1,556
Disagree to "Most of my users with immigrant background are motivated for work"	,596	,033	1,814
Uses on the job training for users who are little motivated and in need of a "push"	,596	,041	1,815
Disagree to that users need for income is a reason to send them to on-the job training	,618	,011	1,855
Index for negative perception of on the job training as a measure for labour market integration	,365	,045	1,440
Indicator of ruleorientation: agrees to that the length of unemployment is important when assigning users to measures	,846	,000	2,331
Agrees to that user participation is part of the definition of "equality in service provision"	,338	,115	1,402
Agrees to that equal outcomes is part of the definition of "equality in service provision"	-,730	,052	,482
Has routines for follow up of participants in on the job training	,315	,147	1,371
Ansenitet_kvartil		,143	
Ansenitet_kvartil(1)	-,354	,245	,702
Ansenitet_kvartil(2)	-,723	,020	,485
Ansenitet_kvartil(3)	-,335	,268	,715
Oslo	1,263	,000	3,535
More than 250 users	1,159	,002	3,187
Constant	-1,729	,000	,178

a Variable(s) entered on step 1: strengere, lavmot2, lavmot3, ikkeinnt, negprak, langledi, Q35c, Q35e, rutine, Ansenitet_kvartil, oslo, brukere250.

Concluding remarks

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The findings that case-worker attitudes towards the users affect the shaping of services is disturbing, and clearly at odds with principles of democracy and rule of the law. It may however be argued that the importance of role definition and case-load is equally disturbing – this may not be intentionally discriminating, but may have the same discriminatory effect. However, former research indicates that on-the-job-training as implemented by the Norwegian employment services has quite moderate or no effect on transition to work.

Whether or not the impact of caseworkers attitudes and role-definition on the shaping of services is actually hindering the labour market integration of immigrants, depends on the outcomes participation could have had in each case. Our data does not allow such analysis. If job placements have no or even negative effects, the prejudicial caseworkers may in fact be doing the users with ethnic minority background a favour.

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ⁱ The numbers presented in this chapter is – unless specified otherwise – based on register data from Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/00/10/innvandring_en/)

ⁱⁱ The immigrant population is defined as people with two foreign-born parents: first-generation immigrants who have moved to Norway and people who were born in Norway of two parents who were born abroad, so called descendants (Statistics Norway). Norwegian population statistics are fully register based.

ⁱⁱⁱ Western immigrants are defined as immigrants from the Nordic countries, Western Europe (except Turkey), North America and Oceania. Non-western immigrants are defined as immigrants from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, South and Central America and Turkey. The third world includes the same countries as non-western countries except Eastern Europe (Statistics Norway).

^{iv} Nordic citizens have had the right to move freely and take up work in other Nordic countries since 1954 (Østby 2002).